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Devolution and parliamentary representation: the case of the Scotland and Wales Bill, 
1976-77 
Adam Evans, Wales Governance Centre, Cardiff University 
Introduction 
Returned with a majority of just three seats at the October 1974 General Election, the Labour 
Governments of 1974-79 oversaw one of the most dramatic periods of post-war British politics. 
Following Harold Wilson’s surprise resignation as the Leader of the Labour Party and Prime 
Minister in 1976, his successor, James Callaghan, was bequeathed an economy seemingly 
deteriorating by the day, a paper-thin parliamentary majority, and the controversial policy of 
devolution to Scotland and Wales. 
 
The Scotland and Wales Bill marked the Labour Government’s first attempt to fulfil its 
commitment to introduce devolution for these nations. It was a Bill dogged by controversy from 
the start, attracting fierce opposition, from the Government’s own backbenches and from the 
Opposition., and prompting intense discussion, pursued doggedly by the Conservative 
Opposition, of what the consequences of devolution should be for the parliamentary 
representation of Scotland and, to a lesser extent, Wales. 
 
In this context, the Cabinet on 20th January 1977, met to discuss the Scotland and Wales Bill and 
a memorandum, penned by the Lord President of the Council (and the Minister responsible for 
steering devolution through the House of Commons) Michael Foot, on the parliamentary 
representation of Scotland and Wales post-devolution. Suggesting that this question had 
“become increasingly hard to temporise over”, and was likely to dog the Government’s efforts to 
get the Bill through the House of Commons, Foot suggested that the Government should “agree 
that the representation issue (covering all four countries) should be considered by the Speaker’s 
Conference”. 1 This calculated concession, to be deployed “at a moment selected to give best 
advantage in relation to the passage of the Bill”, received “general support” and the tentative 
agreement of the Cabinet.2 
 
Yet in less than a fortnight the Government had turned against the idea, with Ministers briefed 
to launch a “direct and robust” attack on the suggestion of a Speaker’s Conference.3 This article 
explores how and why the idea of a referral of the question of territorial representation, post-
devolution, to a Speaker’s Conference came to be identified as the best way of dealing with the 
problem and secure the initial, and conditional, support of Cabinet and why the Government 
then changed its mind.4 As this article will explain, while questions about territorial 
representation in Parliament had long been a feature of devolution debates, parliamentary 
statecraft considerations were at the heart of the rise and fall of Foot’s Speaker’s Conference 
proposal, a reflection of the controversial nature of the Scotland and Wales Bill and the 
increasingly unfavourable parliamentary arithmetic facing the Callaghan Government.  
  
The genesis of the Scotland and Wales Bill 
 
Tabled in the House of Commons in December 1976, the Scotland and Wales Bill represented 
the latest stage in several years of deliberation on the future of the UK’s constitution. In 1969, 
the then Labour Government established, following the success of the SNP and Plaid Cymru at 
                                                          
1 TNA. CAB/129/194/4. Scottish and Welsh Representation at Westminster: Memorandum by the Lord President 
of the Council, 17 January 1977, p.1-2 
2 2 TNA. CAB/129/194/4. Scottish and Welsh Representation at Westminster: Memorandum by the Lord President 
of the Council, 17 January 1977, p.2; TNA. CAB/128/61/2. Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 
Downing Street on Thursday 20 January 1977 at 10.00am, p.9-10  
3 TNA. CAB/198/533: Letter from Quinlan to Saville, dated 1 February 1977 
4 See, also: J. Mitchell, The Scottish Question, (Oxford, 2014), pp.174-179 
the 1967 Hamilton and 1966 Carmarthen by-elections and near misses for Plaid Cymru in by-
elections in Labour heartlands in Rhondda West (1967) and Caerphilly (1968), a Royal 
Commission on the Constitution.5 With a suitably ill-defined remit that ranged from local 
government organisation to “the present functions of the central legislature and government in 
relation to the several countries, nations and regions of the United Kingdom” and “the 
constitutional and economic relationships between the United Kingdom and the Isle of Man, the 
Commission took four years to complete its work, outlasting its original Chair, Lord Crowther 
(following his death in 1972, Lord Kilbrandon was appointed as his successor).6 
 
When the Royal Commission finally reported, it was, however, unable to reach consensus on the 
way forward. Two reports were ultimately published (an official report and a dissenting minority 
report), though the nature of the Royal Commission’s divisions were more complex than a 
straightforward binary division between supporters of these two reports.7 Little immediate public 
action followed the publication of the Royal Commission’s findings and neither the Labour or 
Conservative parties UK manifestos for the February 1974 General Election included any 
                                                          
5 For more on the Royal Commission on the Constitution, see: Mackintosh, J.P. The Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Constitution, The Political Quarterly, 45(1), 1974, pp.115-123; A. Evans, Back to the Future? 
Warnings from History for a Future UK Constitutional Convention, The Political Quarterly, 86(1), pp. 26-28; R. 
Rawlings, Riders on the Storm: Wales, the Union and Territorial Constitutional Crisis, Journal of Law and Society, 
42(4), 471-498; I. McLean and A. McMillan, State of the Union: Unionism and the Alternatives in the United Kingdom Since 
1707, (Oxford, 2005), pp. 181-196 
6 Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969–1973, Vol. I, Report, Presented to Parliament by Command of Her 
Majesty, Cmnd. 5460, 1973. 
7 Bogdanor has divided the Royal Commission’s membership into three distinct blocs: ‘nationalists’ (those that 
sought ‘special treatment [for Wales and Scotland] on the grounds of nationhood’); ‘regionalists’ (those who were 
convinced that ‘the causes of dissatisfaction with government were common to all parts of Britain’ and therefore 
proposed a scheme of executive devolution for Scotland, Wales and the English regions); and, finally, ‘sceptics’ (who 
proposed a deliberative and advisory Welsh Council, but were somewhat more sympathetic to the idea of a Scottish 
Assembly) (Bogdanor, V. Devolution in the United Kingdom, (Oxford, 1999), pp.173-175). 
commitment to implement either the Royal Commission’s recommendations or indeed made 
reference to devolution, both instead being dominated by the Miners’ Strike.8  
 
By the time of the October 1974 General Election, in a context of increasing electoral support 
for the Scottish National Party9 and after considerable internal wrangling between the UK party 
leadership and the Executive of the Labour Party in Scotland, Labour was officially committed 
to devolution. In September 1974, the Labour Government produced the first in a series of 
devolution White Papers, Democracy and Devolution: Proposals for Scotland and Wales, proposing 
directly elected assemblies for Scotland and Wales, both elected under the First-Past-The-Post 
(FPTP) electoral system and both funded by a block-grant from Westminster (tax raising powers 
were not proposed for devolution to either of the assemblies). In neither case, as will be 
discussed later in this article, would devolution lead to a reduction in Parliamentary 
representation and the Secretaries of State for both nations would continue to exist and would 
remain in the Cabinet. The key distinction between the models of devolution proposed for both 
nations was that while the Scottish Assembly would have legislative powers, Wales would have 
executive devolution-only.10 In its October 1974 General Election manifesto, Labour reaffirmed 
this commitment to devolution.11 
 
Following the return of a Labour Government, with a precarious majority of 3 seats, and the 
SNP returning with a record 11 Members of Parliament (after polling over 30% of the vote in 
                                                          
8 Ibid., p.175; Though, as Mitchell has highlighted, work began behind the scenes in Whitehall in December 1973 on 
how to respond to the Royal Commission’s reports (J. Mitchell, Devolution in the UK, (Manchester, 2009), pp.114-117) 
9 In November 1973, the charismatic SNP candidate Margo Macdonald famously won the Labour heartland seat of 
Glasgow Govan at a by-election on a swing of 31%. While, at the General Election in February 1974, the seat 
reverted back to Labour, the SNP returned 7 seats (at that point their best ever performance at a General Election).  
10 Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom, p.178 
11 Mitchell, Devolution in the UK, p.120 
Scotland), the work of developing detailed devolution proposals began. As Mitchell has 
recorded, in November 1974 Wilson established a Ministerial Committee on Devolution, chaired 
by the then Lord President of the Council, Ted Short and a year later, in November 1975, the 
Government published proposals for Scottish and Welsh devolution in the White Paper Our 
Changing Democracy: Devolution to Scotland and Wales.12   
 
While Democracy and Devolution “indicated in broad terms the roles and powers of the 
Assemblies”, Our Changing Democracy sought to “turn those general principles of devolution into 
detailed proposals”.13 The White Paper proposed that, at least initially, the Scottish Assembly 
should be composed of 142 Assembly Members, two members for each of the existing 71 
Parliamentary constituencies in Scotland, elected every four years.14  The head of the Scottish 
devolved executive, the ‘Chief Executive’, would be invited to form an administration after each 
Assembly election by the Secretary of State for Scotland. While Executive Members would 
“normally” be members of the Assembly, there would be “no rigid rule about this”.15   
 
The White Paper proposed that Scottish devolution should proceed on the lines of a conferred 
powers model, as such the Act creating the Assembly “will devolved certain subjects; anything 
not shown as devolution will remain the direct responsibility of the Government and Parliament 
as present”.16  Devolved subjects would include local government, health, social work, education 
and cultural matters, housing and a “wide range of transport matters”.17 The White Paper also 
                                                          
12 Mitchell, Devolution in the UK, 122; HM Government, Our Changing Democracy: Devolution to Scotland and Wales, Cmnd. 
6348 (HMSO, 1975) 
13 HM Government, Our Changing Democracy: Devolution to Scotland and Wales, Cmnd. 6348 (HMSO, 1975), p. 1, para. 1 
14 Ibid., p. 9, para. 32 
15 Ibid., pp. 10-11, paras. 44-46 
16 Ibid., p. 24, para. 116 
17 Ibid., pp. 24-35, para. 114-171 
proposed that, although tax raising powers would not be devolved, the Scottish Assembly would 
be able to levy a surcharge on local authority taxation, as a means of providing the Scottish 
Executive with a “useful degree if discretion”.18  In its summary of the scheme for Scotland, the 
White Paper claimed that this proposed package of devolution will “create for Scotland and 
elected Assembly which across a great range of subjects will take over the work of Parliament 
and they will create a Scottish Executive which, in these subjects, will have wide responsibilities 
now borne by the Government”.19 
 
With regards to Wales, the White Paper continued the Government’s established position that, 
due to Wales’ different history and closer political, legal and administrative bond with England, 
the model of devolution on offer would not be the same as that which was being proposed for 
Scotland.20 Moreover, the Government argued that the appetite for devolution in Wales was 
“different” to that in Scotland. Whereas the Scots, according to the White Paper, favoured 
legislative devolution, the Welsh public desired “better democratic control over the government 
already carried out in Wales, particularly by non-elected bodies”.21  
 
The proposed Welsh Assembly would be a single-chamber body, initially composed of 72 
members, again two for each of the existing Parliamentary constituencies in Wales. Unlike the 
scheme of devolution being proposed for devolution in Scotland, Welsh devolution would be 
constituted on local government lines, with executive power invested in the Assembly as a 
corporate body.22 As the White Paper notes, this would mean “that there will not be a sharp 
distinction between an Executive sponsoring policies and an Assembly discussing and 
                                                          
18 Ibid., p. 22, para. 108 
19 Ibid., p. 35, para. 169 
20 Ibid., p. 36, para. 172-174 
21 Ibid., p. 36, para. 174 
22 Ibid., p. 38, para. 188 
questioning these policies”. Instead, the Assembly would fulfil both deliberative and decision 
making functions, though in practice it was envisaged that most of the Assembly’s work would 
be conducted through its Committees.23 The management of policy making would be overseen 
by the Executive Committee of the Assembly, composed of the Executive Members of each 
Committee and a Chair, appointed by the Assembly and called the ‘Chief Executive’.24   
 
Though the Welsh Assembly would not have primary legislative powers, it would have the power 
to make delegated legislation in the fields devolved to it by Westminster, again in the form of a 
conferred powers model.25 Devolved subjects would include local government, health, education, 
housing and, as with Scotland, a “wide range of matters in the transport field”.26 As with 
Scotland, the Assembly would have the ability to issue a surcharge on local authority taxation.27 
These proposals and the key distinction between the differing forms of devolution proposed for 
Scotland and Wales were at the heart of the Scotland and Wales Bill, introduced before 
Parliament in November 1976 and which received its second reading in December 1976. This 
article will not focus on the Bill itself, but rather on how the Government deliberated over one 
of the by-products of this proposed legislation (and as earlier mentioned a recurrent feature of 
devolution debates). Namely, whether devolution to a part of the United Kingdom should result 
in a reform of that territory’s Parliamentary rights or representation.   
 
Why did the issue of territorial representation, post-devolution arise? 
 
                                                          
23 Ibid., p. 38, para. 188 
24 Ibid., p. 39, para. 191-194 
25 Ibid., p. 39, para. 196 
26 Ibid., pp. 46-53, para 233-273 
27 Ibid., p. 45, para. 229 
As a memorandum prepared by the Cabinet Office’s Constitution Unit in November 1975 
noted, “it is often argued that devolution (particularly legislative devolution) should entail either a 
restriction of voting rights or a reduction in the number of MPs at Westminster”.28 Devolution 
has consistently prompted debate about the representation of the (proposed) affected areas at 
Westminster, from Gladstone’s Home Rule Bills through to the devolution reforms of the late 
1990s.29 These questions have largely arisen as a consequence of Westminster’s dual remit as 
both a state and sub-state legislature, the result being that asymmetric devolution would leave the 
Parliament as the domestic parliament of some but not all parts of the UK.30  In its majority 
report in 1973, the Royal Commission on the Constitution acknowledged this issue nothing that 
                                                          
28 The National Archives (TNA). CAB 198: Records of the Cabinet Office Constitution Unit, CAB 198/533: 
Scottish and Welsh representation at Westminster after devolution. Letter from Bantock to Elridge: Discussion of 
Parliamentary Business Thursday 6 November: Representation at Westminster, 4 November 1975   
29 Facing the ‘double dilemma’ of preventing Irish MPs, post-Home Rule from voting on ‘English or Scotch affairs’, 
yet continuing to tax Ireland at Westminster (V. Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom (Oxford, 1999), p.30), 
Gladstone’s first Home Rule Bill proposed to remove Parliamentary representation from Ireland in its entirety, while 
his second originally included the infamous ‘in and out’ clause (J. Kendle, Ireland and the Federal Solution, (Quebec, 
1989), p.75). The first approach would have resulted in taxation without representation and, according to McLean 
and McMillan, had the 1886 Bill progressed further it “would have been wrecked on that reef”, while the “in and 
out” clause was removed from the 1893 Bill due to its impracticality (indeed, Gladstone had rejected the idea in 
1886, arguing that to devise such a scheme was “passes the wit of man” and would be impossible) (McLean and 
McMillan, State of the Union, p.207-9).  
 
While the ability of Northern Irish MPs to vote on matters at Westminster that were otherwise devolved to 
Stormont prompted Harold Wilson to ask his Attorney General, Sir Elwyn Jones to, fruitlessly, explore an ‘in and 
out’ solution during the 1964-66 Parliament, as a means of preventing the Ulster Unionists from frustrating his 
Government’s policy of steel nationalisation (G. Walker and G. Mulvenna, Northern Ireland Representation at 
Westminster: Constitutional Conundrums and Political Manoeuvres, Parliamentary History, 34(2), 2015, 237-255).   
 
Most recently, the advent of devolution to Scotland and Wales in the late 1990s has resulted in a long and winding 
discussion of English Votes for English Laws (EVEL) that has culminated in reform of the House of Commons’ 
Standing Orders in October 2015 (for detailed analyses of the post-2015 ‘EVEL’ Standing Orders, see: M. Kenny 
and D. Gover, Finding the Good in EVEL: An evaluation of ‘English Votes for English Laws’ in the House of Commons, 
(London, 2016); House of Commons Procedure Committee, English votes for English laws Standing Orders: report of the 
Committee’s technical evaluation, Third Report of Session 2016-17, 19 December 2016, HC 189).  
30 TNA. CAB 198/533. Letter from Scott-Whyte to Garlick, 24 November 1976 
“if legislative devolution were to be selected regions [of the UK] only, a problem would arise 
over the level of representation of those regions in the House of Commons compared with that 
of regions which did not have legislative assemblies of their own”.31  
 
In the specific context of the Scotland and Wales Bill, the issue of territorial representation 
focused the minds of Ministers as a result of Parliamentary pressure. As the Cabinet meeting on 
20th January, in which the Government appeared to endorse the idea of a referral to a Speaker’s 
Conference, noted, “aspects of the role and numbers of Members of Parliament for Scottish and 
Welsh constituencies after devolution had already attracted much attention” with Conservative 
MPs consistently pursuing the issue of territorial representation, post-devolution.32 For example, 
in November 1975, the month that Our Changing Democracy was published, the following early day 
motion (EDM) was tabled in the House of Commons by the Conservative MPs Nigel Lawson, 
Douglas Hurd, John Cope and Kenneth Lewis: 
That this House insists that any devolution of power from Westminster to a Scottish 
Assembly must be accompanied by a commensurate reduction either in the scope or the 
voting rights of Scottish Members at Westminster or in their number.33 
This was the first of what would be a steady stream of attempts by MPs, from across party lines, 
to raise the question of parliamentary representation, post-devolution for Scotland (and Wales).  
 
This cross-party alliance can be evidenced from the Scotland and Wales Bill’s Second Reading 
debate, held between the 13th and 17th December 1976 (the Bill cleared its second reading by a 
                                                          
31 Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969–1973, Vol. I, Report, Presented to Parliament by Command of Her 
Majesty, Cmnd. 5460, 1973, page 246, para. 811 
32 TNA. CAB/128/61/2. Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on Thursday 20 
January 1977 at 10.00am, p.9 
33 TNA. CAB 198/450: Scotland and Wales Bill. Representation at Westminster. Constitutional Aspects of the Bill, 
Letter from Eldridge to Bantock, 3 November 1975 
margin of 292 to 247 votes). During this debate, the question of representation was fast to 
emerge and formed part of Mrs Thatcher’s speech, responding to the opening statement by the 
Prime Minister, James Callaghan. According to Thatcher, the Government had ignored the 
effects of devolution on Parliament and principally on the balance of representation within the 
House. Noting that England and Northern Ireland were already under-represented in the House, 
while Wales and Scotland were over-represented, Mrs Thatcher suggested that this situation was 
already a “grievous imbalance” that “should be corrected by the customary way of referring the 
matter to a Speaker's Conference”, and accused the Government of proposing “to aggravate the 
imbalance by keeping the existing numbers but adding to the 71 Scottish Members 150 people 
sitting in Edinburgh and, in the case of Wales, another 80 people sitting in Cardiff”.34 After 
suggesting that, should devolution be established, there would almost inevitably be demand for 
further powers in Edinburgh”, she warned that there would soon follow demands “here to 
restrict the voting powers of the Scottish Members of Parliament”.  Though the Government 
had tried to ignore this problem, she warned that it would “not go away just because it is 
ignored”.35 
 
Even a committed devolutionist such as David Steel, the then Liberal leader, drew attention to 
the problems devolution caused for representation within Westminster. Steel, his support for 
devolution notwithstanding, outlined seven points “on which the Bill will have to be altered 
fundamentally if it is to meet with final acceptance”. The first of these points was “the question 
                                                          
34 As McLean and McMillan highlight, the recommendations of the 1944 Speaker’s Conference proved critical to the 
post-war over-representation of Scotland and Wales, at the expense of England and Northern Ireland (McLean and 
McMillan, State of the Union, p.214-215). The Speaker’s Conference resolved not to cut the number of Scottish and 
Welsh seats and agreed “that on average every constituency in England should be larger than average” (McLean and 
McMillan, State of the Union, p.215). By 1976, Scotland had 71 MPs, when if the same population basis as applied to 
England it would have had 57, and Wales 36, instead of 31.   
35 HC Debates (Hansard), 13 December 1976, Series 5, Vol. 922, col. 1005 
that cannot be ignored of the over-representation of the people of Wales and Scotland in this 
Chamber once domestic Scottish and Welsh matters have been devolved”. Noting that the Royal 
Commission on the Constitution had dealt with this question and “came out with figures [for the 
level of Scottish and Welsh representation as they should be”, Mr Steel said he could not blame 
any English MP for complaining about 71 Scottish MPs being able to vote on matters affecting 
England, but which are otherwise devolved. As such, Steel was firm in his opinion that the 
Government must tackle that problem.36 
 
Similar concerns were raised by a variety of members. For example, Eric Moonman, a Labour 
MP for Billericay and a sceptic of the need for Scottish and Welsh devolution, as if to pick up on 
Mr Steel’s comments, queried whether English Members would tolerate the continued over-
representation of Scotland in the House of Commons if those members vote on “English 
matters, such as primary and secondary education”.37 While James Molyneaux, an Ulster Unionist 
MP for South Antrim, expressed the outrage of Northern Irish MPs at the proposition that 
Scotland and Wales could maintain their existing levels of parliamentary (over)representation, 
when Northern Ireland was still reduced to the level of under-representation at Westminster (12 
MPs) that had been provided to the province when the Stormont Parliament had existed. As 
Molyneaux told his fellow MPs, “the House will not expect my colleagues and me to support the 
Second Reading of the Bill when not a vestige of just or logical reason exists for denying to 
Ulster equal representation in Parliament”.38 For Russell Fairgrieve, the Conservative MP for 
Aberdeenshire West and an opponent of the devolution plans outlined in the Scotland and 
                                                          
36 Ibid., col.1019 
37 Ibid., col.1033 
38 Ibid., col. 1043 
Wales Bill, it was “patently obvious” that the number of MPs from Scotland would have to be 
reduced and such a reduction would be “one obvious price for our Assembly”.39 
 
However, as many of the above contributions made clear, this was not just a concern about the 
sheer numbers of Scottish (and Welsh) representatives at Westminster, post-devolution. For the 
speeches of Margaret Thatcher, David Steel and even Mr Moonman also spoke of the toleration 
of English MPs at the prospect of Scottish MPs voting on devolved matters. Though this was 
generally used as an attempt to illustrate the unsustainability of Scotland’s existing levels of 
representation in the event of a Scottish Assembly, it touched a much bigger question about the 
nature of parliamentary representation, post-devolution. Tam Dalyell, unsurprisingly, was quick 
to make this point in the Second Reading debate: 
At first glance, and superficially, it might seem sensible for the hon. Member for 
Aberdeenshire, West (Mr. Fairgrieve) to say that in all the circumstances there should be 
50 Members of Parliament from Scotland, but on this issue of reduced representation is 
it any more tolerable that 50 or 35 Members of Parliament should cast votes on subjects 
for which they are not responsible than should 71 of them? The issue is not one which 
can be judged very easily.40 
For Mr Dalyell, it was not just a question of saying that “Scots shall have reduced representation. 
The issue is one of responsibility.”41 The questions prompted by devolution were not just about 
the sum-total of Scottish and Welsh representation, but also about the influence of, and role 
played by, those representatives in Westminster and as a brief prepared by the Cabinet Office’s 
Constitution Unit highlighted in December 1976, these questions were quite distinct from one 
                                                          
39 Ibid., col. 1056 
40 Ibid., col. 1058 
41 Ibid. 
another,42 though both fall under the umbrella of territorial representation, post-devolution and 
were treated as such by the Government. 
 
With sustained pressure on the Government to act to address these questions coming from all 
sides, allied to the fact that the Government was for all extents and purposes a minority 
administration on the subject of devolution (and would soon become a minority administration 
in name as the slim 3 seat majority won in October 1974 was whittled away by deaths and by-
elections), the issue of parliamentary representation was firmly on the political and institutional 
agenda. This article now turns to the question of why Michael Foot, the Minister responsible for 
steering the Scotland and Wales Bill through Parliament, came to view a Speaker’s Conference as 
the best way to respond to these pressures.  
 
Why a Speaker’s Conference? 
 
The Scotland and Wales Bill’s second reading debate was but one aspect of the pressure that was 
building on territorial representation.43 As early as November 1975, when the Early Day Motion 
calling for devolution to “be accompanied by a commensurate reduction either in the scope or 
the voting rights of Scottish Members at Westminster or in their number”44, work was underway 
                                                          
42 TNA. CAB 198/533: Devolution: Representation at Westminster, 13 December 1976, 1 
43 On 19th January 1977, a day before the Cabinet meeting when the idea of a referral to a Speaker’s Conference, 
Michael Quinlan from the Constitution Unit produced a memorandum for Michael Foot on the subject of ‘Scottish 
and Welsh Representation at Westminster’. While this document noted that “so far vague amendments touching on 
the issue [of Scottish and Welsh representation] have been put to Clause 1 of the Scotland and Wales Bill”, it warned 
that “at some point during Committee stage, if the Government does nothing, properly-drafted amendments on the 
issue will be put down, will be selected and will come to a vote” (TNA. CAB 198/533: Scottish and Welsh 
Representation at Westminster CP (77)4, sent from Quinlan to Foot, dated 19 January 1977).  
44 TNA. CAB 198/533: Scotland and Wales Bill. Representation at Westminster. Constitutional Aspects of the Bill, 
Letter from Eldridge to Bantock, 3 November 1975 
within the Cabinet Office’s Constitution Unit on the difficulties devolution posed for Scottish 
and Welsh representation in Westminster and as pressure built on the Government, three main 
options emerged: 1) an ‘in-and-out’ style mechanism to limit the voting rights of Scottish (and 
perhaps Welsh) MPs; 2) a change in the balance of parliamentary representation; and 3) no 
change at all.  
 
The ‘in-and-out’  
 
 As a note produced by the Cabinet Office’s Constitution Unit for the Cabinet acknowledged, 
the logical answer to the post-devolution problem of “Scots MPs continuing to play a role in 
legislation for England, Wales and Northern Ireland on subjects that for Scotland will be 
devolved” was an “’in-and out’ voting arrangement”. Yet, as Gladstone found with his Home 
Rule efforts in the 1880s and 90s and as Harold Wilson and Sir Elwyn Jones discovered in the 
1960s, the Constitution Unit argued that “no form of “in-and-out” voting has been discovered 
that would be… workable”.45  
 
Indeed, the ‘in-and-out’ was swiftly discounted by the Cabinet Office’s Constitution Unit. In a 
memorandum prepared for the Lord President of the Council, Michael Foot, in response to the 
aforementioned EDM, J.L. Bantock, a Civil Servant based in the Constitution Unit, argued that a 
restriction of voting rights had been repeatedly rejected as impractical in the past and more 
recently by the Royal Commission on the Constitution. Furthermore, he raised two practical and 
political hurdles that decades later would become frequent fixtures in the debates regarding 
‘English Votes for English Laws’. Firstly, that it would “be difficult to define “English” business 
                                                          
45 TNA. CAB/129/194/5: Scottish and Welsh Representation in the House of Commons, Note by the Constitution 
Unit, 1 
which does not affect Scotland and Wales”; and secondly, “the potential problem of maintaining 
the Government’s majority on issues from which some members are excluded”.46 
  
While these difficulties meant that the Constitution Unit swiftly moved on to discuss alternate 
responses to the question of territorial representation, post-devolution, the voting rights of 
Scottish MPs re-emerged in November 1976. On 22 November 1976, John Garlick, the Second 
Permanent Secretary, and head of the Constitution Unit, at the Cabinet Office, wrote to Scott 
Whyte (a colleague in the Unit), noting that at that day’s meeting of the Ministerial Committee 
for Devolution Strategy (DVY), Shirley Williams had argued that “the Government would not be 
able indefinitely to continue, post-devolution, an arrangement in which Scots MPs  voted at 
Westminster on the application to England of matters that in Scotland were devolved”. 
According to Garlick, Williams’ comments reflected what, in his opinion, was “an increasing 
awareness of the situation among MPs”.47  
 
Acknowledging the difficulties posed by the idea of restricting voting rights, Garlick noted that 
previous consideration by the Constitution Unit, on the idea of an England and Wales Grand 
Committee (“and other possibilities”) had failed to identify a “workable way ahead”. However, 
he nonetheless wondered whether some further work ought to be done “partly as an educational 
and defensive briefing process for Ministers”, but also in case they could identify “any possibility 
that made a better contribution to the problem than merely reducing Scots representation at 
Westminster”.48 
 
                                                          
46 TNA. CAB 198/533: Note for the Lord President of the Council on representation at Westminster following 
devolution, attached to a letter from Bantock to Eldridge, 4 November 1975 
47 TNA. CAB 198/533: Scots MPs at Westminster, letter from Garlick to Whyte, 22 November 1976.  
48 Ibid.  
While this might suggest that the idea of some form of institutional reform in Westminster, as a 
response to devolution, was not necessarily dead, the response from Quinlan reiterated the 
inherent problems that would arise from altering Westminster’s procedures to accommodate 
differential territorial duties. As Quinlan noted, “the trouble [with devolution] is that the 
difficulties are inherent in using the UK Parliament as the domestic Parliament of some but not 
all parts of the UK”. While this anomaly was more easily ignored during the existence of the 
Stormont Parliament in Northern Ireland, Scottish devolution, according to Quinlan, posed a 
problem “of a different degree” and, so, that anomaly would “be more difficult to set aside” and 
would be further magnified by Scotland’s overrepresentation.49  
 
However, the UK Government, even though it would be “the domestic Executive in differing 
degrees [for the different nations of the UK, as a result of devolution]”, would still need to 
command the support of the House of Commons in order to discharge its duties and to survive 
in office. Therein laid the rub of differential voting rights for MPs. As Quinlan illustrated,  
Suppose that Scottish (and Northern Ireland) members were debarred from voting on 
the Second Reading of a Bill applying to England and Wales, and the Government as a 
result was defeated on what they regarded as an essential manifesto commitment. They 
might then seek a vote of confidence, which would have to be from the whole House 
because they would be, after all, the Government of the whole United Kingdom.50  
The net result could be, according to Quinlan, a Government in a state of legislative and 
administrative limbo. Unable, in this instance, to secure a key manifesto commitment, even 
though it commanded a UK-wide majority. While Quinlan acknowledged that this scenario, of a 
bifurcated House with differing England and Wales and UK-wide majorities in the House of 
Commons, may not be relevant “in a House with a large and geographically well spread 
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Government majority… any system of “inning and outing” seems inevitably to lead to 
contention, frustration and recrimination in a closely balanced House”. 
 
Indeed, even a slightly less radical mechanism, such as an England or England and Wales Grand 
Committee was not without potential problems. While such a device, Quinlan stated, “might 
obscure the problem [of differential voting rights and representation in a post-devolution, 
House]”, ultimately the Government would take little time to be convinced of the need “to call 
upon its full strength to reject a proposal or reverse a decision of the Committee and the 
weakness of the contrivance would then be exposed”. Furthermore, even if a Government felt 
that such a Committee was desirable, there would, according to Quinlan, be little value in such a 
gesture unless there was a broad, cross-party consensus behind it. Such a consensus, he argued, 
“could only be achieved by steering the proposal though the present or some future Committee 
on Procedure, and there could be no certainty of success” (whether such a consensus could be 
reached for a Committee that would be at the mercy of the Government is, at the very least, 
debatable). Ultimately, Quinlan was left to conclude that the only obvious solutions to these 
problems was “a comprehensive federal solution”, which itself raised problems of its own.51   
 
It was thus little surprise that when the Cabinet came to discuss the territorial representation 
issues raised by the Scotland and Wales Bill, the advice from the Constitution Unit was that “an 
“in-and-out” voting arrangement” (described as the logical answer to these problems) was 
impractical on the grounds that it would be: 
a) Difficult to identify English only legislation, not least because “almost any major social 
legislation for England and Wales would have resource implications – and hence tax or 
financial priority aspects – that would also concern Scotland.” Furthermore, even if such 
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legislation could be identified, there would always be the risk that a UK Government could 
seek to ‘game’ the system, “by deliberate inclusion in the Bill of some provisions apply to 
devolved fields in Scotland, or to non-devolved fields”; and 
b) The difficulty that would arise when the party balance in the House of Commons as a whole 
differed from the balance in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. As the Constitution Unit 
noted, such a situation had arisen twice in recent memory, after the 1964 and February 1974 
General Elections. The result “could be deadlock between the Government of the day and 
the majority of those entitled to vote on English, Wales and Northern Ireland legislation. 
While the Constitution Unit memorandum acknowledged that a “more sophisticated relationship 
between the House as a whole and an England-and-Wales committee” could be devised, e.g. by 
providing a Grand Committee with powers akin to the Lords under the Parliament Acts, namely 
a suspensory delay of “one or two years rather than allowing it [the Committee] to indefinitely 
block a measure that the House as a whole were prepared to pass”, such a decide would have 
limited effect and, insofar as the will of the House as a whole would ultimately prevail, “would 
fail to meet the English equity difficulty”.52  
 
In his memorandum to the Cabinet, of which the Constitution Unit’s paper was an annex, 
Michael Foot made clear that these arguments made clear to him that no solution could be 
arrived at through ‘in-and-out’ voting. Instead, he argued that “the only prospect for change is in 
relative representation at Westminster”.53 This article now turns to the development of Michael 
Foot and the Cabinet Office’s Constitution Unit’s thinking on this matter and the factors that 
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lead Michael Foot to propose, and the Cabinet to tentatively endorse, a referral of territorial 
representation to a Speaker’s Conference.  
 
Better and not necessarily disadvantageous to make a measured concession: the case for a referral to a Speaker’s 
Conference 
 
With the “in and out” rejected as unworkable, an alternative response to the questions about 
territorial representation at Westminster, post-devolution, came in the form of a referral of the 
levels of parliamentary representation to a Speaker’s Conference. 
 
Since 1916, Speaker’s Conferences had been used as a mechanism to explore political issues, in 
particular the topic of electoral reform. Initiated by the Government and chaired by the Speaker 
of the House of Commons, these Conferences consisted of parliamentarians from across the 
partisan spectrum and (to varying degrees) parliamentarians from both Houses of Parliament. By 
1976, there had been five such conferences, four of which had focused on questions of electoral 
law and electoral reform (1916-1917, 1944, 1965-1968 and 1973) and by the end of 1976 it had 
become apparent that a referral to a Speaker’s Conference had firmly established itself as Michael 
Foot’s preferred response to the question of territorial representation at Westminster, post-
devolution.54  
 
                                                          
54 The other Speaker’s Conference, which sat between 1919 and 1920, was established to examine and develop 
schemes of devolution for England, Scotland and Wales. The Speaker’s Conference concluded in stalemate, divided 
between proponents of intra-parliamentary devolution (in the form of bicameral grand councils, composed of MPs 
representing constituencies in the respective nation and Peers chosen from the Committee of Selection) and 
advocates of directly-elected devolved legislatures. See: A. Evans, A Lingering Diminuendo? The Conference on 
Devolution, 1919-20. Parliamentary History 35 (3), 2016, 315-335; A. Evans, An interlude of agreement? A 
reassessment of the Conference on Devolution's ‘consensus’ on powers. Contemporary British History 29(4), 2015, 
421-440. 
The first signs that a Speaker’s Conference would be favoured by Foot came in the summer of 
1976.  In August 1976, the Constitution Unit in the Cabinet Office had been commissioned to 
produce a note about Westminster representation post-devolution for the Lord President to 
submit to the Prime Minister. As internal Constitution Unit correspondence reveals, the “present 
thinking” was that on the question of Westminster representation post-devolution, “a problem 
about which something will undoubtedly have to be done”, it may prove necessary “under 
pressure” to offer to refer the issue to a Speaker’s Conference. Given the tactical nature of this 
proposal, it was suggested that the note would have to consider the timing of any announcement 
e.g. whether it should be offered in the Minister’s speech during the second reading or in 
response to an amendment or a point made during the second reading debate.55 This would 
remain Foot’s position until early 1977, culminating in his memorandum to the Cabinet in 
January 1977 that led to the Government endorsing, in principle, his suggestion of referring the 
issue of territorial representation to a Speaker’s Conference, before Foot was forced to abandon 
this policy in favour of retaining the status quo. 
 
Examining Foot’s correspondence and the ruminations of the Cabinet Office’s Constitution 
Unit, who provided the intellectual ballast to Foot’s devolution policies, one can derive a number 
of principal factors that underpinned Foot’s support for a referral to a Speaker’s Conference.  
Namely, a sense that the question of territorial representation would have to be resolved; 
secondly, the idea that a Speaker’s Conference need not be a particularly bad concession for the 
Labour Government to make and in some cases could be quite beneficial and finally, concerns 
about parliamentary management and the realisation that refusing to budge on this issue could 
make the passage of an already controversial Bill, through an essentially Hung Parliament, even 
more difficult.  
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dated 24 August 1976 
 
a) An untenable status quo? 
 
The debates that surrounded the sustainability of Scottish and Welsh over-representation at 
Westminster post-devolution had been pre-empted by the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution’s majority report in 1973. While the Royal Commission on the Constitution 
acknowledged that a case could be made for continuing the existing levels of Scottish and Welsh 
representation (particularly on grounds of national distinctiveness and interests)56, advocates of 
legislative devolution to Scotland and/or Wales on the Commission nonetheless concluded that 
such a scheme should include reform of their representation at Westminster. For proponents of 
legislative devolution on the Commission, the representation of Scotland and Wales should, 
“subject to any allowance which might be found appropriate for special geographical 
conditions”, be on the same population basis as England. The probable effect being that Scottish 
representation would be reduced from 71 to 57 MPs and Wales from 36 to 31.57  
 
As the earlier mentioned Second Reading debate on the Scotland and Wales Bill in December 
1976 demonstrated, there existed a strong body of opinion, stretching across party lines that the 
status quo, that this over-representation in the House of Commons, described by Thatcher as a 
“grievous imbalance”, was not a sustainable proposition post-devolution.  Not least because this 
imbalance risked being magnified as a result of national (and, in the case of Scotland, legislative) 
devolution, with Scottish and Welsh MPs able to vote on, and play a full part in debating, policy 
issues affecting England and Northern Ireland but which had been devolved in Scotland and 
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Wales. As the Labour backbencher, and MP for Billericay, Eric Moonman queried, “will English 
Members tolerate it if the 71 Scottish Members vote on English matters, such as primary and 
secondary education—matters that would be devolved were they Scottish?”58  
 
Given the marginality of the Government’s position in the House of Commons and the cross-
party support in favour of addressing Scotland’s over-representation post-devolution, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the Minister responsible for steering devolution though the House, 
Michael Foot began to examine whether the Government’s position on the status quo should be 
maintained. Indeed, in a letter to the Prime Minister in September 1976, Foot argued that the 
Government would have to judge “whether a policy of obduracy on the status quo could in the 
long run succeed” and if decided it couldn’t, would need to work out, firstly, whether a 
concession might be best offered at an early juncture, “to help our devolution aims”, rather than 
“wrung from us later on”. 
 
Tasked with steering a measure that was not, to put it mildly, widely loved through a difficult 
House of Commons and facing “not unjustified pressures” to act on the question of 
parliamentary representation post-devolution, Foot was genuinely concerned that if the 
Government did not take the initiative and make a “measured concession”, a worse outcome 
could be forced upon them. It was this fear that led Foot to see, by September 1976, a “good 
deal of possible merit in agreeing a reference to the Speaker’s Conference”. Indeed, the centrality 
of this concern to Foot’s thinking on the question of territorial representation at Westminster 
post-devolution can be seen from the conclusions of the Cabinet meeting on 20th January 1977 
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which saw the Cabinet endorse, in principle, his proposal of a reference to a Speaker’s 
Conference.59  
 
According to Foot, not only had the issue of the role and numbers of Scottish and Welsh MPs 
attracted considerable attention during the Scotland and Wales Bill’s parliamentary proceedings, 
but it “seemed certain that sooner or later amendments requiring change from the present 
situation would be pressed to a vote. Not only, Foot feared, was the status quo indefensible in 
equity, but for the Government to “try and stand on it would run a high risk that Parliament 
might impose specific changes damaging to the Government”.60 As he stressed in his 
memorandum to the Cabinet, while a Speaker’s Conference in itself may not be helpful to the 
Government, “something worse… will be forced on us if we offer no concession voluntarily”.61  
 
As the speaking note prepared for Foot’s use at this Cabinet meeting outlined, while a referral of 
Westminster representation to a Speaker’s Conference (“conditional upon devolution coming to 
effect”) was a “respectable and logical” policy, the alternative (i.e. opting for the status quo) 
would risk a litany of damaging consequences for the Government. While some of those 
negative consequences would, in the scheme of things, be temporary (namely, the Government’s 
devolution plan and popularity would suffer), they could also be more longstanding, “for 
example, by having a specific outcome – a precise cut in numbers… carried against us in 
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Parliament”.62 As the speaking note concluded, it was clear that ground would have to be given 
and the concession of a reference to a Speaker’s Conference was “the most gradual and 
controlled as well as the most appropriate way of doing so”.63  
 
b) Not necessarily disadvantageous: the potential merits of a Speaker’s Conference 
 
While support for a Speaker’s Conference was primarily based on defusing parliamentary 
opinion and as a preventative measure, the case for such a referral was also strengthened by 
suggestions that the impact of such a conference may be less significant than would perhaps be 
anticipated and, indeed, may even be beneficial. For example, the conclusions of the Cabinet 
meeting on 20th January 1977 made reference to “evaluations” that suggested the possible impact 
of reducing Scottish and Welsh MPs, and increasing Northern Ireland’s representation at 
Westminster, “to parity with England in electorate size” could have only a limited impact on the 
outcome of General Elections.64   
 
For example, work undertaken by the Cabinet Office’s Constitution Unit in May 1976 suggested 
that a reduction in the level of Scottish representation from 71 MPs to the level it would be due 
on a strictly population basis (57 MPs) would, in the words of the-then head of the Constitution 
Unit Sir John Garlick, “never have resulted in change of a majority party at Westminster since 
1945”.65 At the extreme end of the hypothetical scenarios explored by the Unit, removing all 
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parliamentary representation from Scotland, the Constitution Unit data suggested that on only 
two occasions, 1964 and February 1974, would the majority party in England and Wales have 
been different from that of the UK majority) on two occasion. In May 1976, these findings had 
led Garlick to conclude that the consequences of reducing Scotland’s parliamentary 
representation, post-devolution, was “not so serious for the Labour Party as to make it 
impossible to contemplate”, a judgement that seemed vindicated by the Cabinet’s discussion on 
20th January 1977.66  
 
Furthermore, as the Cabinet Office’s Constitution Unit explained in its memorandum to the 
Cabinet, the impact of any referral of representation to a Speaker’s Conference could be 
mitigated as a result of provisions of the House of Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Act 1949.  
The 1949 Act allowed for a Boundary Commission to depart from certain rules regarding the 
distribution of seats on the grounds of ‘special geographical considerations’. As the Cabinet 
Office’s Constitution Unit noted, while, theoretically, “this provision should not increase the 
total number of seats for Scotland and Wales”, in reality, it could enable the level of 
representation for Scotland and Wales to be raised above what they may be owed on the basis of 
arithmetical parity, thus cushioning the impact of any reduction in the number of Scottish and 
Welsh Members.67  
 
Finally, and perhaps the most appealing of the possible factors that could mitigate any reference 
to a Speaker’s Conference, was the likelihood that any reform would not take place until the 
middle of the 1980s.  
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Why the idea of a referral to a Speaker’s Conference failed.  
 
On February 1 1977, a letter from Quinlan in the Constitution Unit, which included some 
suggested speaking material for the Lord President ahead of a forthcoming debate on the 
Scotland and Wales Bill, indicated that the Government was now focused on making a “direct 
and robust attack” on the case for change to Scotland and Wales’ representation at Westminster 
and against a referral of their representation to a Speaker’s Conference”.68 Within the space of a 
fortnight, the Government had gone from agreeing, in principle, to refer the matter to a 
Speaker’s Conference to a position where the very idea of a referral was seen “as opening the 
door in a degree unacceptable to the government’s supporters”.69   
 
The reasons for this swift reversal can be found in the minutes of a special meeting held at 
Downing Street on 31st January. Among those present at the meeting was the Prime Minister, 
Jim Callaghan; the Lord President of the Council, Michael Foot; and the Chief and Deputy Chief 
Whip, Michael Cocks and Walter Harrison respectively.70 At the heart of this meeting, and also 
the ultimate failure of the idea of a Speaker’s Conference referral, was a difference of opinion 
between Foot and Cocks as to whether a Speaker’s Conference would help or hinder, or indeed 
positively damage, the Labour Government.  
 
According to the minutes of this meeting, Foot contended that the question of whether a 
concession should be made on a Speaker’s Conference had become increasingly urgent as a 
result of an amendment tabled to the Scotland and Wales Bill, tabled by the shadow Leader of 
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the House of Commons, Francis Pym.71 Pym’s amendment, Foot warned, would “have the effect 
of making the first Assembly elections contingent upon the House of Commons having made a 
decision upon the recommendations of a Speaker’s Conference”.72 In Foot’s opinion, “if the 
reference to a Speaker’s Conference was announced, there would be a possibility of defeating the 
amendment”, otherwise he feared that Pym’s amendment would be carried “and it would be very 
difficult later to remove it from the Bill”.73 
 
However, while Foot continued to champion the idea of a managed concession, he also 
recognised that the proposal to refer Scottish and Welsh representation to a Speaker’s 
Conference had resulted in “considerable unhappiness” at a recent meeting of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party (PLP), not least as any reduction “would be contrary to the Manifesto and White 
Paper”.74 And therein lied the rub. While the concession of a Speaker’s Conference may have 
had certain merits as a means of attracting support from the opposition, and in particular the 
Ulster, benches. It’s overall utility as an instrument of parliamentary statecraft would be limited if 
those numbers came at the expense of discontent among the Government’s own backbenchers. 
 
This position was forcefully made by the Chief Whip, who expressed his deep unhappiness at the 
proposal “because of the effect on the opinion of backbenchers”. Backbenchers who, in a 
political climate where by February 1977, the Labour Government’s slim majority had vanished, 
resulting in deals with the SNP and Plaid, for example, on the Aircraft and Shipbuilding 
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Industries Bill, were already growing “very suspicious of private deals with other Parties” and 
were loath to see David Steel claim credit for any concessions (a month before the Callaghan 
Government and Steel’s Liberals announced the Lib-Lab pact).75  
 
With backbenchers already restive at the thought of making concessions to other parties, the idea 
of a reference to a Speaker’s Conference threatened to become a vicious circle, rather than a 
useful expedient for the Government. As Cocks warned the meeting, such a reference would 
leave Scottish and Welsh MPs fearing for their seats, as he explained “there was a consensus 
among backbenchers that any reference would result in reduction of Scots MPs”, while many 
English Members had only supported the Bill out of sense of loyalty to Scottish and Welsh 
colleagues. Far from aiding the Government, such a concession would, in Cocks’ opinion, “make 
it more difficult to get a majority on the guillotine [needed to secure the Bill’s passage]”76 because 
of the animosity it would brew on the Government’s own backbenchers.  As Cocks noted, in 
response to Foots’ suggestion that a concession “was likely to detach the UUUC and 
Nationalists from the Conservatives [on the Pym amendment]”, “it was no use eroding the 
Government’s support on its backbenches by picking up little groups of supporters on particular 
issues”.77 
 
It was this argument that struck a killer blow against the idea of conceding a referral to a 
Speaker’s Conference. With the Deputy Chief reporting that as many as 39 backbenchers had 
indicated that they would either abstain, or rebel against the Government on the crucial 
guillotine vote, the Prime Minister, himself no enthusiast for a referral to a Speaker’s 
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Conference,78 came down on Cocks’ side.  In Callaghan’s opinion, a concession would be seen 
by backbenchers “throwing away of the prospect of a Labour Government in the future 
[because of the likely cut in Scottish and Welsh MPs that would follow a Speaker’s Conference] 
for this Bill on which they were not keen”.79 While the Labour Government had made the 
Scotland and Wales Bill a key part of its legislative agenda, it was in the most reluctant of 
circumstances.80 Ultimately, the Bill was just not important enough, for many in the Labour 
benches, for ether the sort of trade-off that a Speaker’s Conference referral entailed, however 
distant the consequences may be, or for the discontent that it would generate among Labour 
MPs representing Scottish and Welsh constituencies.  
 
Denouement: the collapse of the Scotland and Wales Bill  
On 22 February 1977, the Government was defeated on the guillotine motion for the Scotland 
and Wales Bill by 312-283 votes, with 22 Labour MPs voting against the Government’s motion 
with many others abstaining.81 As a result, the Scotland and Wales Bill, a measure already 
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struggling for life, was effectively dead in the water.82 That evening, Bernard Donoughue 
recorded the Prime Minister as being “quite relaxed”, despite the Government’s defeat, telling 
his aides he did not “mind losing the bill providing we get the credit in Scotland for ‘having tried 
to get devolution’.83  
 
However, while Callaghan remained unenthusiastic about devolution to the last, his Government 
would get no such respite from devolution. As time, deaths, defections and by-elections further 
eroded the Government’s position in the House of Commons, the commitment to implement 
Scottish and Welsh devolution became even more of a political necessity for Callaghan’s 
administration.84 Devolution had formed an important pillar of Lib-Lab dialogue both before, 
and as part of, the formal agreement reached between Callaghan’s Government and David 
Steel’s Liberal Party, with Steel insistent on the re-introduction of devolution legislation as part 
of the price for his Party’s parliamentary support for the Government.85  
 
On 26 July 1977, Michael Foot announced that the re-introduced devolution legislation would 
take the shape of two separate Bills for Scotland and Wales.86 While guillotine motions were won 
for both Bills, devolution continued to inspire fierce hostility among a number of Labour 
backbenchers. The Government had previously conceded the principle of a referendum being 
held prior to the implementation of devolution and, on 25th January 1978, George Cunningham 
MP fatefully moved, and carried by a 166 votes to 151, an amendment that made 
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commencement of the Scotland Bill contingent on ‘Yes’ securing the support of at least 40% of 
the eligible electorate in a referendum.87 Similar provision was made for the Wales Bill. 
 
Unlike the Scotland and Wales Bill, both the Scottish and Wales Bills eventually made it onto the 
statute book as the Scotland Act 1978 and the Wales Act 1978. Neither, however, entered into 
effect. In referendums held on 1st March 1979, neither proposition secured the 40% of total 
eligible voters required by the Cunningham amendment, despite the fact that, in Scotland, a slim 
majority of those voting had voted in favour.88 Following the referendum, a motion of no 
confidence in Her Majesty’s Government was tabled in the House of Commons by the 
Conservative Party on 28th March 1979. Far from Callaghan getting credit in Scotland for trying 
to get devolution, the Scottish National Party’s bloc of MPs joined the UUP, Liberals and SDLP 
in support of the Official Opposition’s motion of no confidence.89 
 
Conclusion 
 
The idea of conceding a reference of territorial representation, post-devolution, to a Speaker’s 
Conference was championed, to a considerable extent, by Foot on parliamentary statecraft 
grounds.90 While private estimates suggested that any reduction in Scottish and Welsh MPs may 
                                                          
87 HC Debates (Hansard) 25 January 1978, Series 5, Vol. 942, col.1542; see also, O. Gay, Scotland and Devolution, 
House of Commons Library Research Paper 97/92 (29 July 1997) 
88 Scotland voted by a margin of 52%-48% in favour of devolution, a Yes vote that represented only 32.9% of the 
total eligible electorate. In Wales, however, devolution was defeated by an overwhelming four to one margin (79.4% 
to 20.3% - equivalent to 11.8%).  
89 The Government was defeated by 311 votes to 310 (HC Debates (Hansard)) 28 March 1979, Series 5, Vol. 965, 
col.585). For a detailed discussion of the period between the referendum votes and the motion of no confidence, 
see: Morgan, Callaghan: A Life, pp.678-685; and, Donoghue, Downing Street Diaries, pp.453-474 
90 Foot’s dogged support for such a concession was also a reflection of the genuine nature of his support for 
devolution. As K.O. Morgan, the biographer of both Foot and Callaghan has noted, Foot was “always a far more 
enthusiastic devolutionist” than Callaghan (Morgan, Callaghan: A Life, p.681). 
have a lesser impact on general election outcomes than had been assumed, a referral to a 
Speaker’s Conference was, at best, the least worst option for the Labour Party.91 As a political 
expedient, it was thus vulnerable to rival considerations of what would best safeguard the Labour 
Government’s position in the House of Commons. In the end, parliamentary statecraft concerns 
prevailed, but not those of Foot. Instead, Callaghan, never an enthusiast for devolution, sided 
with Cocks’ judgement that a Speaker’s Conference referral would only serve to worsen the 
Labour Government’s precarious hold on power by inflaming opinion among Scottish and 
Welsh Labour MPs, many of whom were either opposed to, or unenthused by, the Scotland and 
Wales Bill.  In short, a referral to a Speaker’s Conference was simply a price too high, for too 
poor a reward.  
 
                                                          
91 It is, perhaps, instructive to note that Bernard Donoughue, was firmly of the belief that neither of the potential 
outcomes of a Speaker’s Conference referral, namely a reduction in Scottish representation and an increase in 
England and Northern Ireland’s, “would be likely to assist the Labour Party!” (Donoughue’s comments came in the 
form of annotations to a letter from the Lord President’s office to the Prime Minister’s: TNA. PREM/6/928: Letter 
from Saville to K.R. Stowe, dated 23 November 1976). 
